## Cambridge's

## Single Transferable Vote (STV)



## Getting Into the Weeds

Celeste Landry -- Dec 5, 2017

## Overview of the Weeds

- How Cambridge came to adopt STV
- Factors that contribute to its continued usage
- Contrast with local CO elections in Colorado
- Nuts and bolts - Tallying a real election
- Personal observations


## 2017 VOTING METHODS Position LWV of Colorado

The League supports authorizing and implementing alternatives to plurality voting that allow people to express their preferences more effectively. The League supports gaining on-the-ground experience with alternative voting methods in order to ascertain whether a voting method results in outcomes that match voters' preferences as recorded on their ballots. The League supports voting methods that can improve the election experience, that encourage honest* voting rather than tactical* voting, and that consider ease of implementation.

Considerations:

- Some voting methods are intended for single-winner elections, others for multi-winner elections. It is important that the intended use of a voting method match its actual application. Multi-winner voting methods can promote proportional representation which fosters diversity of our elected officials.
- Election officials should conduct post-election analysis to evaluate the voters' usage of the voting method and the election's reflection of voters' stated preferences. There should be sufficient data transparency - for example, access to ballot records in anonymous form - for an independent analysis to be conducted by other interested groups.
*A voting method encourages "honest" voting when it allows voters to meaningfully support all their preferred candidates, rather than leading them to either not support their favorite or "tactically" indicate a higher preference for a candidate who is not their favorite.


## Plurality Voting Method

Single-winner
Vote for one

- chocolate cake
o brownie
- lemon cake
- truffle


## Voting different <br> Tallying identical

Multi-winner
Vote for (up to) three

- chocolate cake
- brownie
- lemon cake
- truffle
- banana split
- crème brûlée
- Rice Crispies ${ }^{\circledR}$ treat
- chocolate mousse


## Ranking Voting Method

Single-winner (inc. IRV)
Rank in order of preference. One (1) to be elected.

chocolate cake brownie lemon cake
___ truffle

Voting identical
Tallying different

Multi-winner (inc. STV)
Rank in order of preference.
Three (3) to be elected.
___ chocolate cake
__brownie
__ lemon cake
_truffle
___ banana split
___ crème brûlée
__ Rice Crispies ${ }^{\circledR}$ treat chocolate mousse

## Bucklin voting

## (aka Grand Junction method):

## Voters rank candidates.

Promoted by James Bucklin of Grand Junction, Colorado
Bucklin's multi-winner version does NOT promote proportional representation.

Dates of implementation in CO:
1911 - Pueblo
1913 - Denver, CO Springs, and Fort Collins
19?? - Grand Junction
Sources: Center for Election Science -- electology.org, Opa Vote --https://www.opavote.com/methods/other

## History of STV in the US <br> Chart by Jack Santucci, jacksantucci.com, 2017 PhD, Georgetown University

Use of propertional representation (STV) in US cities


Emoty triangles: taicd adoptisn lucward) or repeal reterends (zownward)
All but Now York Uity included HK in council-manager charters.


## Massachusetts Plan E

## Cambridge, MA

er, more proportionally
1938 - Vote for a better, more proportionally representative way to elect officials. (Failed)

1940 - Replace the (corrupt) "strong mayor" system with a "strong city manager - weak mayor" system. (Succeeded)

## Cambridge's STV Elections

## City Council - elect 9 members

The city council chooses one of their members to be the city mayor.

School Committee - elect 6 members
The mayor is the $7^{\text {th }}$ member of the school cmte.

## Minneapolis 4-yr Election Cycle

from "The 2013 Municipal Elections: An Analysis \& Recommendations"


## 2015 Councilmember At Large (2 elected) - Denver

| Courcilmembers At Large |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rabin Kriech | 42,827 votes | $30.32 \%$ |
| Inge fi Silva | 15,376 untes | 10.80\% |
| Jefter/ Vieshington | 17,938 votes | 12.749\% |
| Deboreh "Debbie" Ortega | 54.390 votes | 38.45\% |
| Kayuan Khalathari | 10,730 votes | 76\% |
| Wrie-ill | 7 vo.es | Ube |
| Total Votes | Under Vctes | Over votes |
| 141,230 | 57,632 | 70 |

## Why study Cambridge’s 9-winner and 6-winner elections?

1) Other multi-winner elections in Colorado with more than 2 or 3 winners.

City councils: Boulder, Lafayette, Telluride, etc.
2) Move toward proportional representation with large multi-winner districts rather than geographical (ward) representation.
Denver - 13 council members
Fair Representation Act

## STV $\rightarrow \quad$ End of gerrymandering?



Elbridge Gerry
(1744-1814)

STV is a type of voting method which promotes proportional representation.

Therefore, STV used in "large" districts to elect multiple representatives reduces or eliminates gerrymandering.

## Why is Single Transferable Vote successful in Cambridge?

Repetition - STV election every odd year Single method - STV for both (all) races Tallying - separate ballot for each race, now computerized tallying

## 1979 Cambridge Ballots




## Why is Single Transferable Vote successful in Cambridge?

Repetition - STV election every odd year Single method - STV for both (all) races
Tallying - separate ballot for each race, now computerized tallying
Voters' voice - rankings = \# of candidates

## 2017 Optical Scan Ballot

## CANDIDATES FOR CITY COUNCIL

## for Tarm of Two Yaans

 Instructions to VotersMark your chotcas try completaly riling in the numbered ovals like this uaing a black pen.

- FII in the number ora oval next to your inst choice.
- Fil in the nurnber two fal owal rext to yur eusund ctivise.
- Fil in the number three lī oral nart to your th id ohollow, and 50 on.
- You rray fill in as manty ctcices as you pleze.
- Fil in no more than ane ooml per canclidate-
I Fil in to mure tran ane oral per calumr.
To vote for a write-in candidate:
- Fil in a numberod oval next to the noris you howe written, zhowng your aface as a numbar far a tancidate.
- Fiecrad wate-ins trom tha tog ine down.
If you spoii this bullat, return it far cancelation ta tie ceccian alfoer in charge al the bulcts and get anotor tromsuah offiker.


[^0]
## Why is Single Transferable Vote

 successful in Cambridge?Repetition - STV election every odd year Single method - STV for both (all) races
Tallying - separate ballot for each race, now computerized tallying
Voters' voice - rankings = \# of candidates
Sales pitch - proportional representation

## 2017 City Council Election with Proportional Representation

4 women, 5 men elected

2 candidates won in the $1^{\text {st }}$ round: the mayor (African-American lesbian) and a female Muslim lawyer
If you have \#1 votes from $1 / 10$ of the electorate, you can get elected.
All incumbents got re-elected.

## Why is Single Transferable Vote

 successful in Cambridge?Repetition - STV election every odd year Single method - STV for both (all) races
Tallying - separate ballot for each race, now computerized tallying
Voters' voice - rankings = \# of candidates
Sales pitch - proportional representation
Data/Pride - Robert Winters' website

# Cambridge Factors that Concern ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS 

In-person voting on Election Day is standard.

## Vote at Polls on Election Day



# Cambridge Factors that Concern ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS 

In-person voting on Election Day is standard.

Incumbency status is noted on the ballots.

Rotate candidate names on the ballots.

No need to pre-file as a write-in candidate.

## 2017 Ballot Detail

## Note：write－in candidates and name rotation

| PAUL F．TONER， 24 Newman Slieet | （1） | （2） | （3） | （4） | （6） | （6） | （7） | （8） | （9） | （18） | （11） | （12） | （B） | （14） | （18） | （6） | （17）（18） |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | （1） | （2） | （3） | （4） | （6） | （6） | （7） | （8） | （9） | （18） | （11） | （12） | （B） | （4） | （15） | （6） | （17） |
| GWEN THOMAS VOLMAR， 13 Ware Sleet | （1） | （2） | （3） | （4） | （6） | （6） | （7） | （8） | （9） | （8） | （11） | （12） | （1） | （14） | （18） | （6） | （17）（18） |
| QUINTON Y．ZONDERVAN， 26 Cardna Medains Ave． | （1） | （2） | （3） | （4） | （6） | （6） | （7） | （8） | （9） | （18） | （17） | （12） | （13） | （14） | （18） | （6） | （17） 18 |
| WRITE－IN | （1） | （2） | （3） | （4） | （b） | （6） | （7） | （a） | （9） | （18） | （if） | （2） | （B） | （14） | （15） | （6） | （17）（8） |
| WRITE－IN | 9） | 2） | （5） | ¢ | \％） | B） | D） | D） | 3） | E | E） | 13 | ［ | 19 | E | 臬 | 5 |
| WRITE－IN | （） | 1 | ］） | 8 | B） | 8） | 2） | 1） | 3 | E | E | （3） | 1） | 4 |  | 真 | 6） |
| WRITE－IN | 9） | g． | ［） | 6 | 8 | B） | 2） | B） | B） | E | 2 | 13 | 6） | 19 | 1 | S | 5 |
| WRITE－IN | ） | 8） | ］） | 8 | 3） | B） | 2） | 1） | $3)$ | E | 8 | （3） | ［1） | 18 | 8 | 6 | 8 |
| WRITE－IN | a） | 8） | （b） | $\hat{8}$ | 8） | B） | D | B） | B） | 5 | 8 | 13 | 13 | 19 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| WRIEE－IN | 崖 | （）） | D） | 8 | 8） | B） | 8） | 1） | 3） | E | 8 | （3） | （1） | 14 | B | 交 | 6 |
| WRITE－IN | － | （1） | B） | 8 | ह） | B） | D） | B） | B） | E | 2） | 13 | ［1］ | 14 | 5 | 面 | 6） |
| WRIEEIN | D | ह） | B） | d） | B） | B） | 2） | 1. | 1） | E | E） | 5 | 8 | 13 | 3 | 3 | 3 |

By law，candidates＇names are rotated on ballots at polls，and may appear in a
different order than on this Specimen ballot

# Cambridge Factors that Concern CANDIDATES 

All terms are two years long

Substantial salary for elected officials
$\$ 80 \mathrm{~K}$ for city council
$\$ 40 \mathrm{~K}$ for school cmte

History of slate endorsements

## Sample 2017 City Council Slate

Vote for all 5 in order of your preference.


Dennis Carlone, Sumbul Siddiqui, Vatsady Sivongxay, Jan Devereux, Quinton Zondervan (from L to R)
Cambridge Residents Alliance http:// www.cambridgeresidentsalliance.org/

## Campaign Sign -- Siddiqui



## Campaign Sign - Incumbent Simmons



## Campaign Sign - MacArthur



## Nuts and Bolts of Cambridge STV

http://rwinters.com/elections/supplement.htm

- Droop Quota $\approx 1 /(\#$ of seats +1$)$ of the votes $\rightarrow$ Round up
- Cincinnati Method to transfer surplus votes when a candidate surpasses the quota
- requires a ballot order $\rightarrow$ Random Draw of Precincts
- votes never transfer to a winner
- Under 50 votes $\rightarrow$ simultaneous elimination
- Tiebreaker
- Filling a later vacancy


## Modern Fractional Vote Transfers vs Cincinnati Method

Modern implementations of STV with software allow for a fractional transfer of votes so that if the voter's 1 st-choice candidate surpasses the quota, then a fraction of each vote for that candidate stays with the candidate and the remaining fraction of the unitary vote goes to the next eligible candidate on the ballot.

Cincinnati Method transfers only whole votes, no fractional votes. Counting by hand, you could move the entire ballot to another candidate's pile.

## Comparing Vote Transfers

## Fractional Vote Transfers

1. lemon cake (eliminated)
2. chocolate cake (winner)

3 brownie
4 truffle

- Part of unitary vote to chocolate cake and rest of vote goes to brownie

Cincinnati Method

1. lemon cake (eliminated)
2. chocolate cake (winner)

3 brownie
4 truffle

- Single vote is transferred to brownie


## Mpls Board of Estimate and Taxation 2009 Elect 2 members

| Candidate | Round 1 | Round 2 | Round 2 | Round 3 | Round 3 | Round 4 | Round 4 | Round 5 | Round 5 | Final Round Percentage |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Distributed <br> surplus: <br> Becker |  | Defeated Swartwood and Write-in |  | Defeated <br> Martens |  | Defeated <br> Townsend and Wilkie |  |  |
|  | First preference votes | Vote <br> Change <br> (+ Added, - Subtracted) | Grand Total | Vote <br> Change <br> (+ Added <br> - Subtracted) | Grand Total | Vote <br> Change (+ Added - Subtracted) | Grand Total | Vote <br> Change <br> (+ Added <br> - Subtracted) | Grand Total | May not sum to $100 \%$ due to rounding |
| Becker | 16728 | -6030.4440 | 10697.5560 | 0.0000 | 10697.5560 | 0.0000 | 10697.5560 | 0.0000 | 10697.5560 | 33.34\% |
| Martens | 2778 | 342.8355 | 3120.8355 | 152.5955 | 3273.4310 | -3273.4310 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00\% |
| Swartwood | 975 | 185.6575 | 1160.6575 | -1160.6575 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00\% |
| Townsend | 2323 | 908.4600 | 3231.4600 | 133.0375 | 3364.4975 | 309.5765 | 3674.0740 | 0.0000 | 3674.0740 | 11.45\% |
| Wheeler | 6107 | 1132.6910 | 7239.6910 | 250.3665 | 7490.0575 | 617.3695 | 8107.4270 | 0.0000 | 8107.4270 | 25.27\% |
| Willkie | 2950 | 577.1605 | 3527.1605 | 205.2475 | 3732.4080 | 366.0280 | 4098.4360 | 0.0000 | 4098.4360 | 12.77\% |
| Write-in | 225 | 16.5830 | 241.5830 | -241.5830 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00\% |
| Exhausted | - | 2867.0565 | 2867.0565 | 660.9935 | 3528.0500 | 1980.4570 | 5508.5070 | 0.0000 | 5508.5070 | 17.17\% |
| TOTAL | 32086 |  | 32086.0000 |  | 32086.0000 |  | 32086.0000 |  | 32086.0000 |  |

## 2017 Computer Glitch

For first time in 15 years, a few of the 128 KB memory cards didn't upload. It took 1 ½ hours to rescan ballots with different memory cards.

Cambridge uses 21-year-old voting machines. New machines are scheduled for the 2018 election.

## 2017 School Committee 1st Count

Count \#1 votes.

To get quota, divide 20,708 votes by 7 .

Result $=2958.3$

Round up to next integer.
Quota is 2959 votes.

| Final Official | 1st |
| :--- | ---: |
| Candidate | Count |
| Nolan, Patricia M. | 3458 |
| Bowman, Manikka L. | 2768 |
| Fantini, Alfred B. | 2728 |
| Dexter, Emily R. | 2378 |
| Kelly, Kathleen M. | 1882 |
| Kimbrough, Laurance V. | 1856 |
| Cronin, Fran Albin | 1572 |
| Crutchfield, Jake W. | 1039 |
| Kadete, Elechi M. | 846 |
| Weinstein, David J. | 797 |
| MacArthur, Will | 795 |
| Mitros, Piotr Flawiusz | 511 |
| Write-Ins | 78 |
| Exhausted | 0 |
| Total valid ballots | 20708 |
| Quota = 2959 |  |
| Invalid ballots | 1744 |
| Total ballots | 22452 |

## 2017 School Committee 2nd Count

Choose 499 ballots
for Nolan according to
the Random Draw of
Precincts and transfer
those votes to the \#2 choice.

| Final Official | 1st | Nolan <br> surplus |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Candidate | Count | 2nd Count |  |
| Nolan, Patricia M. | 3458 | -499 | 2959 |
| Bowman, Manikka L. | 2768 | 109 | 2877 |
| Fantini, Alfred B. | 2728 | 38 | 2766 |
| Dexter, Emily R. | 2378 | 95 | 2473 |
| Kelly, Kathleen M. | 1882 | 85 | 1967 |
| Kimbrough, Laurance V. | 1856 | 24 | 1880 |
| Cronin, Fran Albin | 1572 | 52 | 1624 |
| Crutchfield, Jake W. | 1039 | 19 | 1058 |
| Kadete, Elechi M. | 846 | 18 | 864 |
| Weinstein, David J. | 797 | 30 | 827 |
| MacArthur, Will | 795 | 12 | 807 |
| Mitros, Piotr Flawiusz | 511 | 17 | 528 |
| Write-Ins | 78 | 0 | 78 |
| Exhausted | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total valid ballots | 20708 | 0 | 20708 |
| Quota = 2959 |  |  |  |
| Invalid ballots | 1744 |  |  |
| Total ballots | 22452 |  |  |

## 2017 School Committee 3rd Count

| or | Finaloficial | ${ }_{\text {st }}$ | $\underbrace{}_{\substack{\text { Notan } \\ \text { supus }}}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| didates with fewer | Candidite | comm |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| $n 50$ votes |  |  |  |  |
| he next choice | Kill |  |  |  |
| e next choice |  |  |  |  |
| the ballot. |  |  |  |  |
|  | Weisetion Oid. |  |  |  |
|  | Mtios. Piof famusisz |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| balls. | Oaves |  |  |  |

## 2017 School Committee 4th Count

## Eliminate Mitros.

Votes<br>transfer to<br>the next continuing candidate on each ballot.

| Final Official | 1st | Nolan <br> surplus |  | under 50 |  | Mitros <br> transfer |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Candidate | Count | 2nd Count | 3rd Count | 4th Count |  |  |  |
| Nolan, Patricia M. | 3458 | -499 | 2958 | 0 | 2959 | 0 | 2959 |
| Bowman, Manikka L. | 2768 | 109 | 2877 | 5 | 2882 | 69 | 2951 |
| Fantini, Alfred B. | 2728 | 38 | 2768 | 1 | 2767 | 20 | 2787 |
| Dexter, Emily R. | 2378 | 95 | 2473 | 4 | 2477 | 89 | 2566 |
| Kelly, Kathleen M. | 1882 | 85 | 1967 | 1 | 1968 | 28 | 1996 |
| Kimbrough, Laurance V. | 1856 | 24 | 1880 | 1 | 1881 | 34 | 1915 |
| Cronin, Fran Albin | 1572 | 52 | 1624 | 3 | 1627 | 47 | 1674 |
| Crutchfield, Jake W. | 1039 | 19 | 1058 | 1 | 1059 | 32 | 1091 |
| Kadete, Elechi M. | 846 | 18 | 884 | 1 | 865 | 42 | 907 |
| Weinstein, David J. | 797 | 30 | 827 | 1 | 828 | 52 | 880 |
| MacArthur, Will | 795 | 12 | 807 | 0 | 807 | 57 | 864 |
| Mitros, Piotr Flawiusz | 511 | 17 | 528 | 1 | 529 | -529 | 0 |
| Write-Ins | 78 | 0 | 78 | -78 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Exhausted | 0 | 0 | 0 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 118 |
| Total valid ballots | 20708 | 0 | 20708 | 0 | 20708 | 0 | 20708 |
| Quota $=2959$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Invalid ballots | 1744 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total ballots | 22452 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Personal Observations

When adopting STV for an election,

- Separate ballots
- Let \# of rankings = \# of candidates - 1
(Equation for \# of rankings updated after the talk. Thanks to Rob Richie for an insight.)
- Use fractional transfers!

Emotionally hard to change from voting for 5 candidates to having a unitary vote. "The \#1 choice is overwhelmingly the most important choice" in STV.

## Multi-Winner Voting Strategies

Richie: "I sometimes vote for only one candidate even though I'm allowed to vote for more than one." [bullet voting]

Landry: "Sometimes I like 6 candidates, but I'm only allowed to vote for 5 so I consider voting for the 5 that most need my vote even if that means that I don't vote for my favorite."

## Website Resources

- Iwvbc.org, then Teams at Work, then Voting Methods Team (inc. slides from this talk)
- https://www.cambridgema.gov/Departments/ electioncommission
- Robert Winters' website: http://rwinters.com/ elections/index.html
- Minneapolis ranked voting reports: http:// vote.minneapolismn.gov/rcv/rcv-history


[^0]:    By lvw, cumblelese' mannes are rutuled en Dellots el polls, and may appear in a
    elinersmi arder than on this spasinen batik.

